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Abstract 
In this paper I discuss the role that knowledge plays with regard to rational action. 
It has been recently argued that knowledge determines appropriate action. I examine 
this proposal, consider objections against it, and finally propose a defense of it. 
1. Introduction 
In contemporary philosophical research (of at least few decades or so) 
knowledge and (rational) action have been largely taken to be substantially un-
related. On the one hand, it has been assumed that, as a central part of epis-
temology, there are theoretical questions about possibility, nature, kind, falli-
bility, possibility of definition, characterization, etc of knowledge. On the other 
hand, supposedly, there are essentially different issues raised in the framework 
of Bayesian Decision theory, i.e. questions about the correct characteriza-
tion of (rational) action where only subjective credences, not knowledge, play a 
role.
1
 In the recent past, however, such a division of labor has been strongly 
challenged.
2
 As a result, the question of the links between knowledge and ra-
tional action has become one of the most popular issues in current main-
stream epistemology. 
One recent influential attempt to link knowledge and action can be found 
in the work of John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (Hawthorne and Stanley 
2008). Briefly, according to Hawthorne and Stanley, in the relevant decision 
situation, it is appropriate for a person to treat a proposition as a reason for 
acting when she knows that proposition.  
This view, however, has not been unanimously accepted by the philosophi-
cal community. A number of important objections have been raised against 
Hawthorne and Stanley’s account. Given these challenges, many have adop-
 
1 As, for example, in Kaplan (1996). 
2 Attacks against approaches of this kind have come recently from various sides and have 
not always been discussed on the same grounds. See for example, Fantl and McGrath (2002, 
2009), Stanley and Hawthorne (2008), Stanley (2005), Hawthorne (2004), Gibbons (2001), 
Hyman (1999), Williamson (2005). 
134 ARTURS LOGINS 
 
ted more traditional views concerning knowledge and action – that is, views 
that do not postulate an essential link between them. 
The aim of this paper is to consider whether Hawthorne and Stanley’s view 
can be saved from such criticisms. I start by describing in greater detail their 
position. Then I detail the main objections to their principle. Finally, I propose 
a solution to what have been seen as the main problems of Hawthorne and 
Stanley’s principle. 
2. The Reason-Knowledge Principle 
The Reason-Knowledge Principle proposed by Hawthorne and Stanley to 
characterize the link between knowledge and action has been stated in the 
following way:  
The Reason-Knowledge Principle (RKP): Where one’s choice is p-dependent,
3
 it is 
appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know 
that p. (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, p. 578)
4 
 
3 The notion of p-dependency is defined in the following way: “Let us say that a choice be-
tween options x
1
 . . . x
n
 is p-dependent iff the most preferable of x
1
 . . . x
n
 conditional on the prop-
osition that p is not the same as the most preferable of x
1
 . . . x
n
 conditional on the proposition 
that not-p. For p-dependent choices, it seems highly intuitive that knowledge that p makes it 
appropriate to treat p as a reason for action” (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, p. 578). 
4 Notice also that the first sentence of Hawthorne and Stanley’s paper is the question, 
“What is the relation between knowledge and action?” (ibid., p. 571), but their ultimate an-
swer to this question is delineated as a principle about “treating the proposition that p as a 
reason for acting”. This might appear puzzling. The answer to this apparent confusion is that 
Hawthorne and Stanley are interested in the normative role of knowledge in action. They are 
stating a principle about the normativity of action (the normativity from the epistemic point of 
view, not the practical normativity), and hence they are evaluating the question of what makes a 
proposition epistemically appropriate as one’s reason for acting. They claim that knowledge 
and only knowledge of the proposition is what makes it appropriate for the subject to act on 
that proposition (where the action depends on that proposition). Thus, they write, “Hyman 
and Unger are defending the claim that something is a reason for you only if it is known. They 
do not defend the additional normative principle that something is appropriately treated as a 
reason only if it is a reason in their sense. The later is what we are defending” (ibid., p. 571n7). 
And this is a question of epistemic normativity, because it concerns our “appreciation” of rea-
sons for action, i.e. something that seems to pertain to the epistemic domain. Thus, “[w]e are 
in no means opposed to a perspective according to which claims of practical rationality – and 
in particular what one ought to do – are grounded in a decision theory of the sort we have ges-
tured at. But the need to integrate such a theory with reasons for action is still vital. For one 
thing, there are cases where one does what one ought to do but for the wrong reasons, and this 
phenomenon needs explanation. More generally we need to distinguish between the existence 
of a reason for acting and appreciating that reason in such a way as to make it your reason for 
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It is important to notice that Hawthorne and Stanley put their principle in 
terms of appropriateness. Furthermore, they take appropriateness to be un-
derstood as permissibility. They believe that their principle needs to be de-
scribed in terms of appropriateness (understood as permissibility) because re-
quiring an obligation here would be too demanding: 
Our principle concerns what is appropriate to treat as a reason for action, rather 
than what one ought to treat as a reason for action. It would be overly demanding to 
require someone to treat all of their relevant knowledge as reasons for each action 
undertaken. The principle is therefore a claim about what is permissible to treat as 
reasons for action in a given choice situation. (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, p. 578) 
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear in what sense it would be too de-
manding to require rather than just to allow one to treat all of one’s relevant 
knowledge as reasons for each action. Is the problem that we never act (we 
are unable to act) on all of our relevant knowledge in a given situation and 
hence it would be senseless to require something that we never (could) do? 
But in such a case, to merely allow one to act seems to be equally bad. Per-
haps the idea is that obligation comes with many duties, whereas permissi-
bility does not imply duties other than refraining from doing what is im-
permissible? I suspect that putting a principle about the link between treat-
ing p as a reason for action and knowledge in terms of obligation could en-
able Hawthorne and Stanley to prevent some of the objections against their 
principle. This path is not pursued in this paper, however. To explore the 
idea of putting the RKP in terms of obligation would take us too far. We 
would need to determine whether the p-dependency of a particular action 
can be used to exclude part of the subject’s total knowledge from the prop-
ositions on which one ought to act. This would require a much more sub-
stantial inquiry that is beyond the scope of the present work. Furthermore, 
as is explored below, we do not need to translate the RKP in terms of obli-
gations in order to rebut the objections against it, as another, less revision-
ary approach is sufficient. 
The central question, however, is why we should think that the RKP is 
correct. Hawthorne and Stanley have discussed a variety of ordinary cases 
that apparently count in its favor. In these cases, they suggest, the ordinary 
way to evaluate the behavior of the subjects involved is to make reference to 
the possession or absence of knowledge and not to the possession or absence 
of justified belief or other states. The RKP, they argue, manages to make 
sense of our appraisal of behavior in ordinary cases better than any principle 
 
action. . . . As we are thinking about things, it is knowledge that constitutes the relevant sort of 
appreciation that converts the mere existence of a reason into a personal reason” (ibid., p. 580).  
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linking rational action to justified belief. Here are some cases which, ac-
cording to Hawthorne and Stanley, support the RKP: 
(RESTAURANT) 
Suppose for example, that Hannah and Sarah are trying to find a restaurant, at 
which they have time-limited reservations. Instead of asking someone for directions, 
Hannah goes on her hunch that the restaurant is down a street on the left. After 
walking for some amount of time, it becomes quite clear that they went down the 
wrong street. A natural way for Sarah to point out that Hannah made the wrong 
decision is to say, “You shouldn’t have gone down this street, since you did not know 
that the restaurant was there”. (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, p. 571) 
(DOG AND NEEDLE) 
If a parent allows a child to play near a dog and does not know whether the dog 
would bite the child, and if a doctor uses a needle that he did not know to be safe, 
then they are prima facie negligent. Neither the parent nor doctor will get off the 
hook by pointing out that the dog did not in fact bite the child and the needle 
turned out to be safe, nor by pointing out that they were very confident that the 
dog/needle was safe. (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, pp. 572-573) 
(MARRIAGE) 
[S]uppose Hannah’s husband Mordechai has gone off to war, and goes missing 
for many years. Hannah remarries after waiting five years, reasonably assuming her 
husband to be dead. After reemerging from captivity, Mordechai might legitimately 
complain to Hannah that she should not have remarried without knowing that he 
had died. It is reasonable for Mordechai not to be satisfied with the excuse that 
Hannah had a justified belief that he was dead. (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, p. 
573) 
What these cases of folk appraisal of action supposedly demonstrate is 
that if a subject’s action (based on some relevant proposition p – a part of 
an underlying practical reasoning) is in some sense subject to reasonable 
criticism (from an epistemic point of view), then the right explanation of 
this negative appraisal is that the subject did not act on knowledge; in other 
words, she did not know the relevant proposition p, which she had treated 
as a reason for acting. By contraposition, if someone acts on what she knows, 
then her action is positively valuable or blameless (from the epistemic point 
of view). These facts about folk appraisal seem to speak in favor of a prin-
ciple linking rational action to knowledge. It seems then that the RKP gives 
the best explanation of what makes an action rational: properly specified, 
knowledge of a relevant proposition is both sufficient and necessary for ap-
propriate action. 
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3. Objections against the Knowledge Norm 
Given its revolutionary character, it is not surprising that the RKP has al-
ready received a massive amount of criticism and counterexamples. Two 
main objections have been raised against it. On the one hand it has been 
argued that knowledge is not sufficient for rational action.
5
 On the other 
hand it has been argued that knowledge is not necessary for rational action.
6
  
The objection against the condition of sufficiency is based on the idea 
that there are situations in which a person would be reasonably criticized 
for performing an action, even if she knew the proposition on which she 
acted. Jessica Brown (2008) has proposed the very influential case of a sen-
ior surgeon who has to check the data of a patient once more before an op-
eration even if she already knows all the relevant information (that the dis-
ease is in the patient’s left kidney). If she did not verify this information, she 
would be acting in a way that we could reasonably criticize. It seems that in 
this case a subject knows a proposition (that the disease is in the patient’s 
left kidney) but it would not be appropriate to treat it as a reason for acting. 
Something more seems to be needed; mere knowledge of that proposition is 
not sufficient. Hence, it seems that the RKP norm is not the correct one 
(similar counterexamples have been proposed by Baron Reed (2010) and 
Jennifer Lackey (2010)).  
However, it seems that such counterexamples miss the point and hence 
are no threat to the RKP. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2012) has forcefully 
demonstrated that Brown’s case and similar cases do not establish anything 
against the RKP, or against any other principle linking action and knowl-
edge, because given the description in the example, it is not shown that the 
relevant link (which Ichikawa calls “rationalization”) between reasons and ac-
tion is established in these situations. But if this is so, then what the subject 
knows in the example is not her (sufficient) reason for acting. According to 
Ichikawa: 
The knowledge norm says that a proposition p is held as a reason if and only if it 
is known, but it is silent on the extent of the rationalizing relation. . . . [F]or all 
Brown has said, it may be that the proposition that the disease is in the left kidney 
doesn’t rationalize operating without first checking the chart. 
Where the rationalization relation is to be understood in the following 
way: 
 
5 See for example Brown (2008), Neta (2009), Lackey (2010), Reed (2010). 
6 See for example Brown (2008), Neta (2009), Littlejohn (2009), Gerken (2011), Smithies 
(2012). 
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Proposition p rationalizes action A if and only if p would, if held as a reason, be 
a sufficient reason for performing A. (Ichikawa 2012, p. 52) 
In other words, it might be the case (the example does not prove the 
contrary) that without the final checking of the chart, the surgeon does not 
have a sufficient reason to perform the operation. To know that the left 
kidney is the diseased one seems to be insufficient for rationalizing its re-
moval. What exactly is needed for rationalizing the action is not clearly 
stated in Brown’s surgeon case. It seems that the proposition “that the pa-
tient’s data were double checked just before operating” is clearly among the 
reasons that are needed in order to justify the operation. Perhaps even 
other propositions are relevant, such as “This patient is the same person 
that the surgeon checked in the morning”, or “The patient’s disease could 
not have been cured in the time between the morning check and the opera-
tion”, etc. In every case, it seems that Brown’s and other similar examples 
do not manage to refute the sufficiency condition of the RKP. Therefore, 
unless a case can be shown in which the rationalization relation is in place, 
and knowledge of the relevant propositions (of those who rationalize the 
action) is still not sufficient for the action to be rational, we can conclude 
that the RKP is not refuted by these kinds of counterexamples. Hence, in 
the remainder of this section we will focus on the objection against the nec-
essary condition, leaving aside the criticism of the condition of sufficiency. 
Most of the objections against the necessary condition of knowledge for 
rational action are based on (or at least illustrated by) some plausible ordi-
nary cases. Two types of cases have been proposed: cases of action based 
upon a false but justified belief, and cases of action in Gettier-type situa-
tions. Here are two such examples: 
(MARRIAGE 2. MORDECHAI’S UNEXPECTED RETURN) 
Let us instead consider a version of the case [cf. (MARRIAGE) above] in which 
Hannah is extremely well-warranted, her deciding whether to marry is urgent and 
the stakes are lower. Assume that the military has informed her that the enemy does 
not take any prisoners. Assume, moreover, that Hannah has learned that no soldier 
who has been missing in action has reemerged. Assume that Hannah has contacted 
the surviving members of Mordechai’s squad and that they all described his disap-
pearance in such a way that his death seems like the only viable explanation. As-
sume that Hannah and Mordechai have discussed the risks of war and agreed that 
she has to remarry if he were to die. Assume, finally, that practicalities dictate that 
she has to remarry quickly, or not at all. 
When Mordechai returns, he may well become dissatisfied. But it is unclear that 
his dissatisfaction with Hannah’s remarrying is epistemically legitimate although it 
might be psychologically understandable. Given the specification of the case, Han-
nah’s action appears to be, at least epistemically, reasonable. (Gerken 2011, p. 535) 
KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICE, AND MERIT  139 
 
(TIMETABLE) 
Suppose, then, that S leaves the office at 12.00pm in order to meet her partner 
for lunch at 1pm. S believes truly that there is an express train at 12.20pm which 
would allow her to arrive in time to make lunch. Further, this belief is justified: S 
checked the train timetable on the internet just before leaving the office. In fact, 
unbeknownst to S, she is in a Gettier situation: a hacker has got into the train web-
site and for a joke has replaced all of the current timetables with the last season’s 
timetables. Luckily for S, according to both the old and new timetables, there is an 
express at 12.00pm. So, S’s belief is a case of true justified belief but not knowledge. 
Let’s now consider whether it’s appropriate for S to rely on her belief that there is 
an express at 12.20pm in deciding what to do. It seems that it is appropriate. After 
all, S checked the timetable and she had no reason to suppose that a hacker had re-
placed the current timetable with last season’s. In such circumstances, it seems ap-
propriate for her to rely on the belief that there is an express at 12.20pm in deciding 
what to do. (Brown 2008, p. 172) 
What these (and similar) cases supposedly demonstrate is that knowledge 
is not necessary for rational action. Hence, the RKP is claimed to be false. 
However, the proponents of the RKP have an answer to this kind of ob-
jection, which they anticipated. Central to this answer is the appeal to the 
possibility of being excused for violating a norm.
7
 The idea is that in certain 
situations we tend to not criticize someone who has acted on less than knowl-
edge because one is excusable for having transgressed the norm. Crucially, 
it follows then that even in such situations the norm remains in place. More-
over, the need for an action to be excused in such cases shows that there 
was an instance of a violation of the norm.
8
 Hence, norms can be (and in 
fact often are) violated. But that, however, should not be taken to bear 
against the norm in question. We should rather distinguish, following a popu-
lar distinction concerning assertions, between an action being primarily and 
secondarily appropriate.
9
 An action is primarily appropriate when it com-
plies with a norm. An action is secondarily appropriate when a person reason-
ably believes that it complies with the norm. In cases like (TIMETABLE) 
and (MARRIAGE 2), the subject’s action is secondarily appropriate, but is 
not primarily appropriate. Hence, these are cases in which subjects violate 
the norm of action. But they are excusable, since their actions are secondar-
 
7 See, for example, Objection 5 and the reply to it in Hawthorne and Stanley (2008, p. 586). 
8 Ibid. See also Williamson (2005, p. 227). 
9 See DeRose (2002), who, when arguing in favor of the knowledge norm of assertion, 
makes an important distinction between an assertion being primarily appropriate when it ef-
fectively complies with the norm and an assertion being secondarily appropriate when the 
speaker reasonably believes to have made an appropriate assertion. See also Williamson (2000, 
ch. 5 on Assertion). Cf. Gerken (2011).  
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ily appropriate. This then explains why we tend to think that subjects in cases 
like (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) should not be criticized. Such an ex-
planation seems to allow us to maintain the RKP against potential refuta-
tions. 
Many opponents of the RKP have nevertheless found that the appeal to 
excuses cannot save the RKP. There seem to be at least two problems with 
the appeal to excuses as an explanation of why subjects in cases like (TIME-
TABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) are not subject to criticism (i.e. criticism 
from the epistemic point of view). First, there is what we may call a qualita-
tive problem of explanation by excuses – the RKP proponents do not have a 
satisfactory account of what exactly is an excuse in the relevant cases. And 
second, there is a quantitative problem with explanation by appeal to excus-
es – the high number of cases where proponents of the RKP will need to 
appeal to excuses as an explanation of blamelessness for acting on less than 
knowledge makes the appeal to excuses a rather implausible or even ad hoc 
explanation. Let us consider both problems in more detail. 
The qualitative problem is the problem of explaining what exactly must 
be excused in the various cases. The appeal to excuses presupposes that 
there is a norm that has been transgressed, where this transgression does 
not receive a negative appraisal. The important element concerning the 
norm of action is that the action which is excused is still in some sense not 
really “good” or correct because it is still a transgression of a norm; in other 
words, it does not comply with the norm. In this sense then, an excused ac-
tion is not as “good” as an action that complies perfectly with the norm. 
This point, however, seems to some to be very implausible when we consid-
er cases such as (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2). Many authors have 
observed that in such cases there is nothing to be excused.
10
 S’s decision to 
go to the train station is just as good as our ordinary decisions in normal 
(unGettiered) situations. There does not seem to be a difference here. Simi-
larly, Hannah’s choice to remarry in the (MARRIAGE 2) case seems to be 
as rational as Hannah
*
’s choice in a counterfactual case, where Hannah
*
 
makes the choice to remarry, but her husband Mordachai is indeed dead. 
So they do not appear at all to be transgressions in need of an excuse.  
Moreover, it has been observed that appealing to excuses in cases such 
as (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) cannot solve a further problem con-
cerning irrational but excusable actions. As it stands, the appeal to excuses 
cannot reasonably distinguish between cases like (TIMETABLE) and (MAR-
RIAGE 2), on the one hand, and on the other hand cases in which a subject 
 
10 See, for example, Brown (2008), Neta (2009), Smithies (2012), Littlejohn (2009), 
Gerken (2011). 
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is under the effect of drugs, has a stroke, is deluded or is mentally ill and 
hence acts irrationally but is excusable for acting this way.
11
 According to 
the RKP, in both instances the actions are excused and hence have the same 
status vis-à-vis their rationality. However, quite clearly, there seems to be a 
difference between both types of situations. A mentally ill person who has 
an obsessive thought that aliens are preparing to come and take him away 
might act irrationally on this belief, for instance, by bricking up his win-
dows. His action, based on a belief that aliens might come, a belief that is 
clearly not a piece of knowledge, is not a rational one, but it is still an ex-
cusable one, since the person is mentally ill. According to opponents of the 
RKP, situations like (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) seem to be situa-
tions of an absolutely different kind – it does not even seem that the actions 
in the (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) cases are (epistemically) irra-
tional in any sense. The appeal to excuses by the RKP’s proponents cannot 
account for this difference; hence, according to many, the RKP is wrong.
12
 
The second problem, the quantitative problem, points to the apparently 
ad hoc nature of the excuse maneuver. More precisely, if the RKP’s propo-
nents use excuses to explain why in some cases actions that do not comply 
with the knowledge norm nevertheless may not be criticized, then they will 
need to use this explanation in a large number of cases, since cases in which 
someone acts on less than knowledge are abundant. But then, they will of-
fer an odd picture of our behavior. According to such a picture, we are 
generally excused but not correct in our actions. But this seems to be ad 
hoc. In short, this kind of view seems to be more like an ad hoc rather than a 
plausible explanation of the real situation. As Gerken has noted:  
So, it appears that there will be an abundance of cases in which someone may be 
excused from violating the knowledge norm. This suggest that the knowledge ac-
count will result in a proliferation of excuses. Indeed, it stands in danger of multi-
plying excuses beyond plausibility. (Gerken 2011, p. 544) 
 
11 See Smithies (2012) and Gerken (2011) for this kind of example and the argument 
against the knowledge norm based on these kinds of irrational but excusable acts. 
12 See Gerken (2011) for a more sophisticated argument against the excuse maneuver. He 
has argued that either the proponents of the RKP state the excuse in epistemic terms or in 
non-epistemic but rather deontological terms. If the excuse is stated in deontological terms, 
then, according to Gerken, it imposes an implausibly strong deontological constraint on ra-
tional action. But if an excuse is explained in epistemic terms, then either it places a too-
strong, higher order requirement on it which would exclude a full range of ordinary cases, or it 
collapses into a justification norm of action. His conclusion is that the RKP cannot propose a satis-
factory account of what is an excuse in the cases where it appeals to the use of an excuse.  
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In light of these problems, many have adopted more traditional princi-
ples about knowledge and action, principles according to which it is justifi-
cation and not knowledge that makes an action (based on deliberation) ra-
tional. The basic idea is that one’s acting on p (practical deliberation on p) 
is rational if and only if the subject is justified in believing that p. Some vari-
ations of the justification norm exist now in the literature. Some require that 
the subject be justified in believing that she is in a position to know that p. 
Others stick to the traditional picture, in which justified belief that p is nec-
essary and sufficient for rationally acting on p.
13
 
4. Knowledge and Levels of Normativity in Practical Deliberation 
Should we then conclude that knowledge and rational action are not es-
sentially connected? The main objective of this paper is to argue that no, we 
should not. I claim that there is a way to maintain a principle linking ration-
al action to knowledge that can avoid the objections discussed above. In the 
reminder of this article I will show how this principle can be defended. In 
doing so, I propose to clarify the normative property that the knowledge 
norm of action captures, and also to complement the RKP with an addi-
tional principle concerning (epistemically) rational action.  
My proposal is that (a version of) the RKP norm can be maintained if 
we allow for more nuanced normative categories concerning action from the 
epistemic point of view. As noted earlier, Hawthorne and Stanley suppose 
that rational action (from the epistemic point of view) is appropriate action. 
But appropriate action is just permissible action, according to them. From 
this it follows that an inappropriate action is a prohibited (from the epis-
temic point of view) action. In short, according to Hawthorne and Stanley’s 
(and their critics’) view there are only two categories of normative properties 
– from the epistemic point of view actions can be either permissible (when 
they comply with the RKP) or prohibited (when they do not comply with 
the RKP). According to Hawthorne and Stanley’s approach, these two cat-
egories are reflected in our ordinary evaluations of actions expressing 
blamelessness and blameworthiness accordingly. I, however, believe that 
this categorization is too coarse-grained, as it fails to capture the full picture 
of our evaluations of actions. I claim that our evaluations of actions from 
the epistemic point of view are more complex than those captured by the 
normative properties “permissible” and “prohibited”. In what follows I will 
 
13 Among those who endorse a kind of justified belief norm of (rational) action are for ex-
ample Gerken (2011), Smith (2012). Among those who defend a more sophisticated norm, a 
norm of justified belief that one knows that p, are for example Smithies (2012), Neta (2009). 
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try to propose a better categorization. More specifically, my aim is to out-
line a more nuanced categorization of the normativity of action from the 
epistemic point of view. The advantage of my classification is that it respects 
all of Hawthorne and Stanley’s intuitions, and at the same time it provides a 
way to avoid the objections that have been raised against their view.  
Here, then, is my classification of the (epistemically) normative statuses 
of actions with respect to their evaluation:  
(AAA) extra praise deserving actions; 
(AA) meritorious actions; 
(A) blameless actions; 
(B) blameworthy but excused actions; 
(C) blameworthy and non-excusable actions. 
We can see the well-foundedness of this classification system when we con-
sider our ordinary evaluations of actions. 
The (AAA) category is the category that captures the (epistemically) norma-
tive property of actions that receive our most positive evaluations. Actions 
that receive the most positive evaluations from the epistemic point of view 
are actions that accomplish something supererogatory, something for which 
they deserve an extraordinary, supplementary praise. Examples of such ac-
tions include the following cases: 
(TIMETABLE 2) 
Suppose that everything is like in the (TIMETABLE) case, except that S, before 
deciding to leave her office does a quick supplementary research on the Internet 
and discovers that the timetable that she just consulted is the same as that of the 
previous year. She now has discovered that there might be a problem with the accu-
racy of the timetable and therefore she does not base her action on it. Instead she 
calls the info-line and gets firsthand information that the train leaves at the same 
time as last year, that is at 12.20pm. She now bases her acting on knowledge of the 
proposition that the train is leaving at 12.20pm.  
(MATRIX) 
Some inhabitants of the Matrix world manage to discover the truth about their 
deception. Given the extremely well-designed computer system that rules the Ma-
trix world, it was an almost impossible task. Now they, the resurgence team, act on 
their knowledge and try to free the others. 
(TRUMAN SHOW) 
Truman in the Truman Show manages, based on careful observation, to discov-
er that he lives in a television studio and that his life is a giant construction. Now, he 
is trying to reach the horizon in order to escape, based on his knowledge that the 
skies he sees are just another artificial construction. 
144 ARTURS LOGINS 
 
The second normative category of actions with respect to the epistemic 
point of view is the category in which actions receive the evaluation of meri-
toriousness, the (AA) category in my classification.  
The term “meritoriousness” might appear a bit old-fashioned, but I be-
lieve it captures better than any other a very important category that we also 
use when we evaluate actions from the epistemic point of view, a category 
that seems to be neglected in contemporary discussions about the norms of 
rationality of action. Before turning to this evaluative category of action in 
more detail, I would like to make some comments on how I understand 
meritoriousness in general.  
“Meritorious”, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, has various 
senses. It means, among other things: (1) “Of an action: entitling a person 
to reward”; and also (2) “Deserving reward or gratitude. Now also more 
generally: well-deserving; meriting commendation; having merit. In recent 
use the term is sometimes understood as conferring limited praise, being 
applied to works regarded as painstaking and comprehensive, rather than 
original or stylish”; and (3) “Law (chiefly N. Amer.). Of an action, a claim, 
etc: having merits, likely to succeed on the merits of the case”.
14
 In short, 
the evaluative category of meritoriousness seems to capture those positive eval-
uations (i.e. praise) which are not the highest positive evaluations possible 
(since it confers only “limited praise”); at the same time, it is a category that 
recognizes the desert (appropriateness) of reward and also captures the idea 
(especially in the legal context) that some actions or agents deserve the re-
ward (for example, success, praise or admiration) because of their inherent, 
intrinsic qualities, and not due to some external or environmental context 
or luck (see sense 3 and also one of the senses of “the merit”).
15
 It is im-
portant to note that meritorious actions and agents are not merely blame-
less actions or agents. Meritorious actions have something more, some posi-
tive value that exceeds mere blamelessness. Although, as already noted, 
“meritoriousness” is not the highest possible positive evaluation, the highest 
one being captured by evaluations of the supererogatory aspects of some 
actions. Hence, meritorious actions are actions that are not supererogatory 
 
14 See http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/116809?redirectedFrom=meritorious#eid. 
15 From the Oxford English Dictionary: “the merits (rarely, †the merit) (of a case, question, 
etc.): (Law) the intrinsic rights and wrongs of a case, in contradistinction to extraneous or 
technical points, esp. of procedure; (gen.) the intrinsic rights and wrongs or excellences and 
defects of something. on its (also their, etc.) merits : without regard to anything but its (their, 
etc.) intrinsic excellences or defects. to have the merits (Law): (of a party to a suit, a suit, a 
claim, etc.) to be in the right as to the question in dispute (said esp. when for technical rea-
sons a favourable decision cannot be given)” (http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/116794?rskey= 
EmYSZE&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid). 
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and not prohibited, but at the same time are accomplished with excellence 
(they are admirable), in a way that is (and could only be) successful. For ex-
ample, a child under her parents’ authority has the obligation to study at 
school (that is, the prohibition to fail in school). But one can comply with 
this obligation in various ways. One can comply with this obligation in a ra-
ther mediocre way. In this case, the child is blameless, since she managed to 
comply with the norm. However, she is merely blameless. In particular, she 
is in no way admirable in her compliance with the obligation of learning at 
school. On the contrary, if a child pursues her studies with excellence, that 
is, in such a way that as a result she could not fail (in any of the closest pos-
sible worlds) the examination and she gains some inherent skills – what we 
can call “merits” – she is not merely blameless, she is admirable. In this lat-
ter case, she is still blameless, but she has also something more – she learned 
in a meritorious way. 
Furthermore, in philosophical discourse the term “merit” is not periph-
eral, though it is not central to contemporary discussions.
16
 
Now, turning back to the evaluation of actions from the epistemic point 
of view, I believe that we need to state explicitly the normative category that 
can capture evaluations attributing (epistemic) meritoriousness to actions. 
These evaluations are captured, I believe, by the normative property under 
the (AA) category. The difference between the (AAA) category and the (AA) 
category is that, while in the (AAA) category the extra-praiseworthy actions 
are of the supererogatory kind, that is, they deserve extra praise because of 
some heroic or at least extraordinary non-obligatory achievement, the ac-
tions from the (AA) kind are admirable (limited praise worthy) actions that 
are not supererogatory. The difference with respect to the actions of type (A) 
is that (AA) actions are permitted actions that deserve admiration, whereas 
(A) actions are permitted actions that are not admirable. In short, the actions 
of the (AA) kind are those in which we tend to judge, “Well done!” when 
we consider them from the epistemic point of view. On the other hand, the 
expression, “It’s OK”, will better suit merely blameless actions (the (A) cat-
egory), and expressions with superlatives will be best applied to actions of the 
(AAA) kind. The following example illustrates well the (AA) kind of actions: 
 
16 Merit was of course an important element in Scholastic philosophy and also played a 
crucial role in Kantian ethics. It has been associated with a person’s admirable qualities, as 
defined by Blackburn: “A person’s merits are his or her admirable qualities” (Blackburn 2008, 
s.v. “merit”). However, the foundational issues concerning merit, such as the issue of the 
grounds of distinction between moral and non-moral merit, seem to be rather complicated. 
Unfortunately we will not be able to undertake here a further, metatheorethical examination of 
“merit” and “meritorious”.  
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(STAYING AT HOME) 
Peter’s friends are having great time in a chalet in the nearby mountains. Peter 
has finished his work late on a Friday night and plans to take his car to join his 
friends in the chalet for the weekend. The chalet is not far away, the trip is not ex-
pensive, and Peter has no obligations or important things to do in town over the 
weekend. Furthermore, these are very old friends, friends that Peter hasn’t seen in 
years. However, as he gets ready to leave, he realizes that his car has no winter tires, 
nor chains for the tires. The road, however, is rather icy. Besides that, Peter is rather 
tired. But he has no clear idea about the degree of danger of driving in these condi-
tions. Therefore, he does a quick search on Google about driving on ice without 
winter tires or chains and finds some websites where experts give their opinion on 
the subject. In short, he learns that going up into the mountains now without winter 
tires and in his current fatigued condition could easily lead to an accident. So he 
decides not to go. More specifically, he treats the propositions that he is tired and 
his car is not well equipped to guarantee his safety on the way to the chalet as a rea-
son for staying at home and not going to the chalet. 
It seems that in this example, our natural reaction to Peter’s practical de-
liberation is not just, “It’s OK to stay home”, but rather, “Well done!”. In 
other words, we are inclined to give (limited) praise, or admiration, to Pe-
ter’s action rather than to pronounce a mere judgment of blamelessness. On 
the other hand, Peter’s action is not extra praiseworthy either. He did not 
do something that surpassed his obligations. Apparently, he did not do some-
thing supererogatory. He merely did what he should have done – more pre-
cisely, he did not do what was prohibited. But still, he did it in a meritori-
ous way. He could not have failed to treat the right reason for action as his 
reason for action in this scenario. He did not merely accidentally treat the 
right reason for action as his reason for action. For example, he did not stay 
at home just because he had a vague idea that it could be dangerous to 
drive in certain conditions. 
The third category, category (A), concerns the actions that are judged to 
be blameless from the epistemic point of view. Importantly, these actions are 
not blameless because they are excused. There is nothing to be excused, since 
they comply with the relevant obligation – they are not transgressing what is 
prohibited. However, they are not admirable actions either. The success of 
these actions is not due to the agent’s own skills or to their intrinsic excellence, 
but it is either accidental or depends in an important way on lucky circum-
stances (environmental luck). In my previous example concerning meritorious 
and non-meritorious action in general, the child who merely passes her ex-
amination is clearly blameless, but her success might be due to the luck of 
getting the only question that she knew the answer to, or to some random 
and vague recollection of the subject matter, which is clearly a case of luck. 
Similarly, in the domain of practical deliberation typical examples of this 
kind are provided by cases such as (MARRIAGE 2) and (TIMETABLE). 
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Agents in such cases are clearly blameless, and there is nothing we need to ex-
cuse them for. However, their success in treating the right reason for action as 
their reason for action is largely due to accidental circumstances and luck, 
which makes their actions not actually admirable, but only not blameworthy.  
The fourth category, (B), concerns actions that seem to be blameworthy, 
but are nevertheless excused. Paradigmatic examples include the Mentally ill, 
Drug user and Brainwashing cases from Smithies (2012) and Gerken 
(2011). Someone who bricks his windows up because he believes that aliens 
are preparing to kidnap him is blameworthy in his practical deliberation. 
But if such a person is mentally ill, or under the effects of some drug, he is 
excused for this point of practical deliberation. Clearly, then, this category 
differs from (A) as well as from (C). 
Category (C) contains the worst evaluations – the most negative, that is, 
actions that are blameworthy and are also non-excusable. We can include in 
this category actions based on wishful thinking or other cognitive vices. For 
example, if Peter from my (STAYING AT HOME) example above, after 
finding the information about the dangers of driving on icy roads without 
winter tires, nevertheless took his car and drove to the chalet on the basis of 
a mere conviction that nothing bad could happen to him, we would natural-
ly judge his practical deliberation as blameworthy and not excusable. In this 
case he acted, it seems, merely on wishful thinking. 
Before we return to the issue of the RKP, it is important to notice that not 
only is there a gradual ordering in the present categorization of normativity in 
practical deliberation, but some categories appear to encompass others. The 
following chart illustrates the normative picture that I have just described con-
cerning the normativity of actions from the epistemic point of view: 
Table 1 
 (extra) praiseworthy meritorious blameless excused  
AAA YES YES - - Ex. (MATRIX) 
 
AA NO YES - - Ex. (STAYING 
AT HOME) 
A NO NO YES - Ex. (TIMETABLE), 
(MARRIAGE 2) 
B NO NO NO YES Ex. (MARRIAGE), 
Mentally ill 
C NO NO NO NO Ex. Acting on 
wishful thinking 
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Now, my thesis is that we should restrict the RKP, that is, the knowledge 
norm of action, to the normative category (AA). In order to maintain this the-
sis I propose a complementary principle about the appropriateness of actions 
in which I link appropriateness with meritoriousness in the following way: 
The Appropriate-Meritorious Action Principle (AMAP): It is appropriate to treat a 
proposition p as a reason for action if and only if it is meritorious to treat the propo-
sition p as a reason for action. 
In evaluating the AMAP we must answer two questions. The first question 
is why it is appropriate to treat a proposition as a reason for action when it 
is meritorious to treat that proposition as a reason for action. The second is 
why it is appropriate to treat a proposition as a reason for action only when 
it is meritorious to treat that proposition as a reason for action. The first 
question is easy to answer. If an action is meritorious from the epistemic 
point of view, as defined in the discussion about category (AA), then it can-
not be the case that it is not appropriate. Actions that are admirable are also 
appropriate. It would be very odd to say things like, “This action is admira-
ble, but it is clearly not appropriate”. Hence, I take it for granted that an 
admirable quality implies appropriateness. Therefore, a meritorious action, 
that is, an admirable action (in the sense of an action deserving limited 
praise), is also an appropriate one. What is more, since meritorious actions 
have the intrinsic quality of excellence, practical deliberations of the (AA) 
kind will not fail in any nearby possible world – that is, subjects performing 
meritorious practical deliberation adopt the right reason for action not only 
in the actual world, but also in all nearby possible worlds. Hence, it seems 
that if an action is meritorious it is also always appropriate. 
A more complex issue is raised by the second question. Why should we 
think that an action is epistemically appropriate only when it is meritorious? 
Here, in responding to this question, my strategy is to appeal to the non-acci-
dental character of appropriate actions. I assume that appropriate actions can-
not be appropriate accidentally. In general, it seems quite odd to accept that 
something or someone satisfies the appropriateness condition and yet the 
item or the subject in question is appropriate only by accident. Imagine that 
X is your favorite candidate for the presidency of your country. It would be 
odd for you to answer the question of whether you think that X is an ap-
propriate candidate for the job by saying, “Well, yes, she is an appropriate 
candidate, but I know that anyone else could be as good as her if they were 
in the same situation as her”. In short, it seems that we would not judge some-
one as an appropriate candidate for that or another job, if we were not sure 
about their previous personal achievements, especially if we knew that their 
previous achievements were due only to fortunate circumstances. The non-
accidental character of appropriateness seems to be confirmed also by our 
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everyday use of “appropriate”. A quick (that is, neither exhaustive nor con-
clusive) search on Google shows that among approximately 606,000,000 
occurrences of the word “appropriate” only 4,710 match with “accidentally 
appropriate”, among which the majority seems to be either a play on words 
or loose talk (inexact usage).
17
 Hence, we have a prima facie reason to think 
that what is appropriate cannot be such merely by accident. The same, I 
believe, also applies to practical deliberation: an appropriate practical de-
liberation cannot be appropriate by accident. To say that someone treats a 
proposition as a reason for action appropriately but accidentally seems to me 
to be, at best, imprecise usage. 
Now, the important point is that among the levels of evaluation of actions 
that have been identified, only meritoriousness and extra-praiseworthiness can 
confer a non-accidental character on an action. Hence, as appropriateness 
excludes accident, it seems that only these two could be receivable candi-
dates for identifying appropriate actions. Appropriate actions are not mere-
ly blameless actions, since blamelessness is compatible with accident. As in 
the case of the student passing an examination merely by the luck of getting 
a question which corresponds with the only answer she knows, it seems that 
any action that is merely blameless can be successful only by accident. So it 
is not the case that an action can be appropriate merely by being blameless. 
On the other hand, appropriate actions cannot be limited to those deserv-
ing extra praise. Certainly, extra praiseworthy actions are appropriate. But 
it seems that extra praiseworthy actions are appropriate by virtue of being 
meritorious. To claim the contrary would be to demand too much. There-
fore, it seems that appropriateness can be captured only by meritoriousness. 
The last step in my defense of an adjusted version of the RKP consists in 
claiming that only knowledge can satisfy the meritoriousness constraint on 
practical deliberation. Only knowledge, and not justified true belief (or justi-
fied false belief), has the intrinsic characteristic of being non-accidental. One 
cannot know something merely by accident. However, one can have justi-
fied true belief merely by accident, as Gettier cases have famously taught 
us. But, as we have already seen, a meritorious practical deliberation cannot 
be such merely by accident. Hence, one treats a proposition as a reason for 
acting in a meritorious way only when one knows it. 
But if only knowledge satisfies meritoriousness and only meritorious ac-
tions are appropriate, then we have come full-circle back to the RPK norm: 
when a subject’s choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposi-
tion that p as a reason for action if and only if the subject knows that p. 
 
17 Similar habits of usage seems also to apply to the word “suitable”, which I take to be not 
a perfect, but still a synonym of “appropriate”.  
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The RKP supplemented with the AMAP seems to do justice to all the 
intuitive reactions to the original cases that Hawthorne and Stanley advanced 
in favor of the RKP. Each of the criticisms that Hawthorne and Stanley ob-
served in their cases can be stated as a criticism about the non-meritorious 
character of the actions involved. Some cases involve additional blamewor-
thiness. I suspect that some cases, such as (DOG AND NEEDLE), seem to 
receive extra blame because they involve actions that have consequences 
which are potentially morally wrong. It is not clear that we can distinguish 
neatly between judgments attributing blame merely on epistemic-theor-
etical grounds and judgments attributing blame on moral grounds. Hence, 
it might be that our intuitions (of blameworthiness) in the original cases are 
largely due to our judgments about the moral consequences of the case. 
However, even if the subjects in the original cases were blameworthy also 
from the epistemic point of view, this would not contradict my interpreta-
tion of the RKP. This is because blameworthiness implies the absence of meri-
toriousness (see the table of normative levels in practical deliberation). There-
fore, any action that is judged blameworthy from the epistemic point of 
view also lacks any merit from the epistemic point of view. 
My approach also preempts some objections that have been raised to 
the RKP. Notably, the (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) cases no longer 
constitute a problem. Armed with our classification of the levels of norma-
tivity in practical deliberation, we can agree with Brown and Gerken that 
the subjects in the (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) cases are not blame-
worthy (though still not excused), but at the same time we can maintain that 
their practical deliberations are not appropriate. Most importantly, in taking 
this line of defense we need not appeal to excuses. Subjects in the (TIME-
TABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) cases do not treat the relevant propositions as 
reasons for acting appropriately because they do not treat them as reasons 
for acting in a meritorious way. Only knowledge can be a foundation for meri-
torious practical deliberation and hence also for appropriate practical delib-
eration.  
My classification also enables us to see why cases like those of the Men-
tally ill, the Brainwashed, and the Drug user are not a problem for the RKP. 
The practical deliberation in the Mentally ill case is an excused blamewor-
thy action, whereas in (TIMETABLE) and (MARRIAGE 2) it is a blameless 
practical deliberation. In short, Mentally ill and (TIMETABLE) correspond 
to different normative categories. This is compatible with the RKP.  
Thus, I conclude that the RKP manages to capture the correct link between 
rational action and knowledge. In defining rational action as appropriate de-
liberation, and appropriate deliberation as meritorious deliberation, we can 
see that only knowledge is necessary for rational action. Knowledge, and only 
knowledge, can make it rational to treat a proposition as a reason for action. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper I argued for a version of the knowledge account of rational 
action. I first considered a previous proposal, the Reason-Knowledge Prin-
ciple, stated by Hawthorne and Stanley. I examined its motivation and con-
sidered various objections against it. In light of these objections I proposed 
a supplementary principle linking appropriate action to meritorious action. 
I concluded that, given my supplementary principle and a detailed account 
of the levels of normativity in practical deliberation, the Reason-Knowledge 
Principle can be maintained.∗ 
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